Abstract This paper proposes the design of a security-enhanced RFID authentication protocol which meets the privacy protection for tag bearers. The protocol which uses AES(Advanced Encryption Standard) cipher algorithm is based on a three-way challenge response authentication scheme. In addition, three different types of protocol packet formats are also presented by extending the ISO/IEC 18000-3 standard for realizing the security-enhanced authentication mechanism in RFID system environment. Through the comparison of security, it was shown that the proposed scheme has better performance in user data confidentiality, Man-in-the-middle replay attack, and replay attack, and forgery resistance, compared with conventional some protocols. In order to validate the proposed protocol, a digital Codec of RFID tag is also designed based on the protocol. This Codec has been described in Verilog HDL and also synthesized using Xilinx Virtex XCV400E device.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification System (RFID) is the latest technology to play an important role for object identification as a ubiquitous infrastructure [1] [2] . The tags attached to products are used to identify the object during production or in uses via radio frequency which may be passive or active [2] .
The ISO/IEC 18000 standard defines a protocol for RFID tags that handles bi-directional communication between a reader device and the tags [2] [3] . Unfortunately, the data exchange between RFID reader and tags on this protocol is not secure, and there are no mechanisms defined to authenticate the tags to the reader. When this protocol is used for the challengeresponse process, it is vulnerable to a man-inthe-middle attack which is an eavesdropper can capture texts for both challenge and response by just sniffing with a protocol analyzer [4] . Thus, a cipher algorithm such as AES is necessary to protect branded goods from forgery.
In reference [5] , a robust mutual fits the low-cost system in authentication protocol environment to meet the privacy protection for tag bearers. However, this approach is has not given any results implemented in hardware. In addition, the existing protocol which is defined in the ISO/IEC 18000-3 standard does not include cryptographic authentication mechanism [3] . This paper proposes the design of a securityenhanced RFID authentication protocol based on AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) cipher algorithm. In addition, three different types of protocol frame formats are also presented by extending the ISO/IEC 18000-3 standard [3] for realizing the proposed authentication mechanism in RFID system environment. In order to validate the proposed protocol, a digital Codec of RFID tag is also designed based on the proposed protocol.
Ⅱ. Related Works
RFID system
RFID system is used for the automated identification of products, which is similar to smart cards. In this system, data can be stores and processed on a chip. In general, RFID systems are composed of three components such as RFID reader, RFID tag, and back-end server.
RFID reader includes antenna, transceiver and decoder which communicate with the tag, and it is also used as an interface between a back-end server and the tag. The RF tag which is placed on the object to be identified contains a transponder with a memory chip that possesses a unique ID. The back-end server which is secure server has a database which stores the various information of each tags obtained from the reader in some useful manner. In general, Thursted
Third Party (TTP) can read all messages, and if TTP is compromised, all communications are insecure.
The various command signals (queries) are generated in the reader, and the signals can be received in a tag when a tag is within range of the signal. The tag sends out its identification (anonymous ID) or encoded data to the reader, when responding to commands from the reader. The received ID then should send to the back-end server to be processed. 
Authentication protocol
A Hash Lock scheme which was presented by MIT [2] based on a hash function. The reader has key k for each tag, and each tag holds the result metaID, metaID = hash(k) of a hash function. The reader sends a key that is related to metaID received from the tag, and a tag receives a request for ID access and sends metaID in response. The tag then calculates the hash function from the received key and checks whether the result of the hash function corresponds to the metaID stored in the tag. Although this scheme offers good reliability at low cost, since metaID is fixed, the adversary can track the tag via metaID.
To resolve this problem, Randomized hash lock scheme has been introduced by MIT, which is an extension of the hash lock type scheme [2] . It requires the tag to have a hash function and a pseudo-random generator. Each tag calculates the hash function based on the input from pseudo-random generated, r and id,
i.e., c = Hash(id∥r). The tag then sends c and r to the reader.
The reader sends the data to the back-end server.
The server calculates the hash function using the input as the received r and id for each ID stored in the server. The server then identifies the id that is related to the received and sends the id to the reader. The tag output changes with each access, so this scheme deters tracking.
However, this scheme allows the location history of the tag to be traced if the secret information in the tag is revealed, i.e., this scheme cannot satisfy the forward security requirement.
Thus, on the basis of AES cipher algorithm, a new security-enhanced authentication protocol will be presented for RFID system in this paper.
Ⅲ. Proposed Authentication Algorithm
Security-enhanced authentication protocol
The protocol is the technical framework on which all future products can be built, including tags, readers and other technology [9] . Conventional randomized hash lock scheme allows the location history of the tag to be traced if the secret information in the tag is revealed.
The enhanced protocol is designed on the basis of the concept of "the reader talks first" [7] . This means that any tag does not start transmitting unless it has received and properly decoded an instruction sent by the reader. This protocol which uses AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) cipher algorithm is based on a three-way challenge response scheme which is an exchange of a request from reader to tag and a response from the tag to the reader. In this approach, the random number is generated by the reader while the conventional approach generates it in the tag [2] . Thus, our scheme can be realized low-cost tag by reducing hardware-overhead of the tag compare to the conventional one.
In this work, back-end Server is that host computer has database (DB) including tag information such as ID (chip serial numbers of tags), k (key value of tags), and each data. We assume that both the server and tags have unique secret key of k, and Reader has Random Number Generator (RNG) which generates random number denoted as RN.
Now, we explain the detailed procedure for executing the proposed authentication protocol.
In (Step 1), Reader sends a query with RN as challenge to Tag. We defined this query to an extended Inventory request packet (EIQP) in which RN is inserted (see Table 1 ), which is extension of the original Inventory request format defined in ISO/IEC 1800-3 [3] .
In (
Step 2), Tag generates an encrypted data, Ek(ID, CD, RN) using AES algorithm, and the data is inserted into an extended Inventory response packet (EIPP) shown in Table 2 
In (Step 6), Reader generates first CID by
Exclusive-OR operation of Masking value (Mv) and ID, i.e., CID = Mv ⊕ ID, and then Reader reconstructs an EIQP packet using the both CID and RN1. In this time,
Reader sends this new packet to Tag, which is shown in Table 3 .
In (Step 7), Tag ID is extracted from the received CID from Reader using Masking value, and then CD is changed; CD = CD ⊕ RN1. The data obtained in this
Step are used to make the encrypted data such as Ek(ID, CD, RN) for next communication. As a result, replay attack in this Tag can be prevented because the original value CD is changed by Exclusive-Oring with RN1.
Design of extended protocol packets
The ISO/IEC 18000-3 standard describes the communication of the tags with a reader using a frequency of 13.56Mhz [3] [5] . The standard Inventory response contains the fields of Flags, DSFID, UID, and CRC [3] . In the extended version shown in Table 2 , two fields of CD and RN are added to the packet assigned to each 16 bits.
In Table 2 The standard Select request contains the fields of Flags, Select, UID, and CRC. In the extended version, UID field is changed to CID and RN1 field with16 bits is added to the packet. Table 3 shows an extended Select request packet (ESQP) format with CID and RN1, which modifies conventional standard Select request format. As we can see from the proposed protocol shown in Fig. 2 , the original value CD is changed by Exclusive-Oring with RN1 after CID is verified. Thus replay attack can be prevented by using this modified packet.
The proposed protocol has been evaluated the view point of the security requirement. Table 4 shows the comparison of the security requirements and the possible attacks. Data items for comparison make reference to results shown in [5] . 
IV. Digital Codec Design and Simulation
The RFID system is divided into two parts of analog front-end and digital parts. The analog front-end part is responsible for modulation and demodulation of data for the power supply of the tag and the digital part(Codec) handles control functions and data processing tasks [4] .
The digital Codec for a Tag is composed of Packet
Processor, CRC(Cycle Redundancy Check) Calculator, System Controller, AES cipher algorithm, and EPROM.
AES(Advanced Encryption Standard) is a symmetric key encryption technique, which provides strong encryption.
Packet-processor filters the required data after analyzing commands of various packets received from RF/analog front-end. It is possible for reconstruction of the packed data which will be sent to the reader. CRC calculator block calculates CRC value on data for transmitting and receiving and it compares the CRC value with the received one for detecting errors during transmission [4] . It is also read some information from tag memory, EPROM. The EPROM has been stored in unique information of tag's ID, CD and key value of k.
The Codec designed has been described in Verilog HDL, and logic synthesis has been performed using Xilinx Virtex XCV400E device which is supported by IDEC of KAIST in Korea.
In order to verify operation of the system, initial vectors for EPROM in this Tag are required, which have three fields of UID, DSFID and key value of k; UID = 0x686B0A07000007E0, CD = 0x8ADE, AES Key(Ek) =0x2B28AB097EAEF7CF15D2154F16A6883C [8] .
In addition, three types of the packet data are used as input vectors for simulation, which is given in Table   1 , 2 and 3. A packet data shown in Table 1 is used as input vector for simulating the extended Inventory request format. Two packets of Table 2 and 3 are also used as input vectors for the EIPP and the EIQP formats, respectively. In order to fully validate the designed Codec, the timing simulation has been also performed using Mentor Graphics' ModelSimTM. from Tag, and then the decrypted data is "0xD3E2F30ADE47D80D03808B99DF00580" shown in Table 2 . Fig. 4 shows process for selecting Tag from data generated in Reader, where The received data is "2325e2b5f5f8fffff81fef120000e8b5" which is the part shown in the rectangle of Fig. 4 (see Table 3 ). 
V. Conclusions
In this paper, the design of a security-enhanced RFID authentication protocol has been presented based on AES encrytion algorithm, which meets the privacy protection for tag bearers. In addition, digital Codec for RFID tag has been designed based on the protocol.
The designed Codec is described in Verilog HDL and synthesized using the Synopsys Design Compiler.
The proposed security-enhanced protocol has better performance in user data confidentiality, tag anonymity, Man-in-the-middle attack prevention, replay attack, and forgery resistance, compared with some protocols [5] [7] .
